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Management Control Strategies in Global Supply Chains: a Comparative Study of 
Chinese Service Outsourcing Firms 
 
Introduction 
Despite the rich literature on global value chains (GVC) (Gereffi et al. 2005) and global 
production networks (GPN) (Henderson et al. 2002)1, our understanding is still limited about 
how firms, especially supplier firms, organise their work and employment to meet 
competitive challenges in global production networks and requirements from clients (Yeung 
& Coe 2015). This is, to a large extent, due to the fact that GVC/GPN analysis tends to focus 
mainly on the  inter-firm power relations in the chain/network, whilst paying little attention 
to the implications of these linkages for the internal dynamics of supplier firms, particularly 
in relation to the organisation of work and employment at workplaces (Smith et al. 2002)  
There have been a number of recent efforts to fill this gap. Coe & Yeung (2015), for 
example, have emphasised that the strategic choices of firms in global production networks 
shape processes of intra-firm coordination as well as inter-firm relations. They state that ‘we 
allow for the possibility of actors in the same global production networks exercising 
multiple….types of firm-level strategy’ (p.126). They relate this variability to differences in 
corporate culture, institutional setting, ownership, industry dynamics and technological 
trajectories. In dealing with the pressures on costs, quality and timing, supplier firms draw on 
and develop their existing resources to manage their internal processes. Central to this is an 
understanding of how supplier firms organise their labour.  
Indeed, bringing labour back into the analysis of GVC/GPN has recently been 
emphasised in a number of places (e.g. Castree 2010; Taylor et al. 2015; Taylor et al. 
2013).This literature tends to focus around the impact of global supply chains on workers 
from the point of view of describing how they have led to deteriorating working conditions 
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and close surveillance at suppliers’ workplaces (Taylor et al. 2014; Pun & Smith 2007). 
Empirical studies of this are mainly concerned about matters of workers’ rights and working 
conditions, particularly in relation to working hours, workplace safety, wage levels (and 
whether they are correctly calculated and regularly paid) and the level of work 
intensification. This focus on labour has led to a distinction between ‘economic upgrading’ 
(where firms enhance their competitiveness at the level of improved efficiencies and 
expanded capabilities) and ‘social upgrading’ in terms of improved labour conditions, 
increasing labour right and a preferable management-labour relations (Barrientos et al. 2011; 
Rossi 2013). Research has shown that economic and social upgrading do not go together and 
firm-level upgrading is often achieved via a simultaneous deterioration of workers’ 
conditions (Selwyn 2013). Although these studies provide valuable insights on how workers 
are organised and managed in global production systems, they tend to treat workers as 
passive ‘victims’ as capital seeks cheap labour (Smith et al. 2002), reflecting and reproducing 
an orthodox ‘labour as object’ approach (Bair & Werner 2015). This is problematic because it 
assumes that a particular governance structure within global supply chains necessitates or 
correlates with a particular form of work organisation and employment status. It consistently 
downplays the agentic power of employers and employees in the chain (Bair & Werner 
2015).  
In response to the critique of the ‘labour as object’ approach, some studies emphasise 
the potential agency of workers as active shapers of the structures and strategies inherent to 
GPNs (Cumbers et al. 2008; Coe 2015). Despite a useful corrective to treating labour in 
purely objective terms, the ‘labour as agent’ approach is limited by a conflation of trade 
union activity with labour agency tout court, evidenced by their empirical focus on the 
collective organisation of workers through labour unions (Lier 2007). Therefore, such a 
corrective offers limited leverage in understanding workplace practices and relations within 
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firms where trade unions are weak, informal worker organisation limited and other forms of 
collective identity such as gender, ethnicity, nationality and/or status may be more salient 
(Taylor et al. 2015).  
Reinforcing this argument, in the recent collection by Newsome et al. (2015), the 
authors comment that ‘the expanded labour-integrated version of the GPN understates the 
importance of the workplace as a key site for the extraction of surplus. This general oversight 
is perhaps surprising. One would have expected more to have been written on management 
control strategies, labour indeterminacy, the immediate wage-effort bargain and worker 
responses at the workplace level’ (Taylor et al. 2015: 14). The present paper, therefore, 
responds to this call by looking into how supplier firms develop and implement control 
strategies within global supply chains. These control strategies link the dynamics of product 
markets and labour markets to the internal structures and conditions under which labour 
works in order to sustain the profitability of the firm. 
The research for this article is based on an intensive, comparative case analysis of two 
Chinese supplier firms. It draws on in-depth rich data from observation, 140 interviews and 
archival materials at the supplier firms’ workplaces in both China and Japan. Building on 
Gereffi et al's. (2005) governance framework of global supply chains and Smith's (2006) 
analysis of the double indeterminacy of labour power, we aim to advance our extant 
understanding of the effect of global supply chain relationships at work, by developing an 
analysis of how labour effort and labour mobility are coordinated and controlled by the 
supplier firms within different forms of global supply chain relations.  
The article proceeds as follows. The following section identifies the precise 
theoretical concerns that this study seeks to address. Specifically, we discuss how to integrate 
product market conditions with global supply chains analysis in a way that shows the 
connection to the strategic choice of managers and their use of different control strategies 
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over labour in the workplace and the labour market. This is followed by a discussion of our 
research methodology. Subsequent to this, the findings of the empirical analysis are 
presented. We show that supplier firms have participated in different sorts of product markets 
and consistently developed distinctive management control approaches in managing both the 
efforts and mobility of labour. We then discuss the findings in light of their implications for 
research into the effect of global supply chains at work.  
Product markets and management control strategies in global supply chains 
In relation to product markets, we propose developing Gereffi et al.’s (2005) governance 
framework of global supply chains. By intersecting the three supply chain variables of 
complexity of transaction, the ability to codify transactions, and the capabilities of suppliers, 
Gereffi et al. (2005) describe, within global value chains, a variety of forms of governance 
which they describe as ‘market-based’, ‘modular, ‘relational’, ‘captive’ and ‘hierarchical’. In 
our view, these forms of governance also reflect different sorts of product markets and how 
suppliers and buyers can resolve typical product market dilemmas such as ensuring cost 
efficiency, quality improvement and innovative developments. The ‘market-based’ global 
supply chain, governed by price, involves easily codified transactions, simple product 
specifications and capable suppliers. The ‘modular’ supply chain involves specialist suppliers 
and complex products that can be unified and codified in the form of production modules. 
Supplier firms in this form of chain retain control over the knowledge which they create by 
black-boxing it into modules. The ‘relational’ chain exists when product specifications 
cannot be codified, transactions are complex and supplier capabilities are high. Suppliers and 
leading firms are mutually dependent in this chain. Close face-to-face interaction and high 
levels of explicit coordination are needed in order to exchange tacit information; there is 
sharing of knowledge and high levels of trust that there will not be leakage of jointly created 
knowledge to competitors. In ‘captive’ governance mechanisms, ‘small suppliers are 
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transactionally dependent on much larger buyers. Suppliers face significant switching costs 
and are, therefore, ‘captive’. Such networks are frequently characterised by ‘a high degree of 
monitoring and control by lead firms.’ (Gereffi et al. 2005: 84). Products may be complex 
and specific to the buyer, resulting in ‘capture’ as the supplier would face high costs to find 
new clients and new products. The ‘hierarchy’ chain represents the fully internalised 
operations of the vertically integrated firm. 
As managers strategize to enter supply chains in these varying product market 
contexts, their challenge is to build an internal organisational structure that will maximise 
their possibilities for gaining contracts that are profitable to themselves as well as to the 
buyers. One key problem that they have to solve therefore is the problem of putting labour to 
work within such a context. Smith (2006) suggest two elements to this general problem. The 
first is managing the work effort bargain around wages and conditions, work pace etc.. Here 
management can vary their strategy along the direct control-responsible autonomy dimension 
as discussed in authors such as Edwards (1979), Braveman (1974), Burawoy (1979) and 
Friedman (1977). Such variations can be internalised within the firm with certain groups of 
employees having more responsible autonomy (e.g. skilled workers or permanent employees 
or male employees) whilst other employees are subject to more direct control and monitoring.  
The second element is what Smith describes as the problem of labour mobility. 
Flexibilisation of labour has its limits where employers wish to retain certain skills or 
qualities. Frequent turnover of employees risks losing investments in training but also in the 
development of tacit knowledge. Therefore, employers may engage in strategies of ‘labour 
capture’, i.e. making it difficult for certain groups of workers to exercise their exit right to 
move around labour markets, e.g. through non-transferable seniority rules, through the 
creation of internal labour markets advantaging insiders and keeping out mid-level hires, 
pension agreements that are relatively non-portable, immigration rules that confine people to 
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a particular employer etc.. Employers therefore have a range of options open to them in terms 
of how they utilise the potential for labour mobility amongst their workforce and the degree 
to which they aim to capture certain groups and limit their exit possibilities.  
It is of course important to emphasise that employers are not free to make strategy as 
they please. As well as the constraints set by product market characteristics, they exist in 
particular institutional environments where the powers of both labour and employers in the 
workplace and in the market are shaped by legal regulations, informal norms, mechanisms for 
implementation and the power and role of the state.  GVC/GPN analysis emphasises indeed 
that outsourcing enables buyers to shop around such institutional regimes until they find one 
that maximises their benefits. Whilst sellers also may have this internal capacity to shift 
around if they are of sufficient scale, they are often likely to be more fixed in location and 
therefore have to become creative at managing their control strategies to overcome potential  
disadvantages perceived by buyers, e.g. in terms of cost and quality, in order to make 
themselves efficient and competitive in particular supply chain structures. 
To conclude, our argument is that the existing GVC/GPN analysis has underplayed 
the role of strategic choice, managerial agency and management control systems in 
identifying how links in the chain are coordinated. In our view, managers in supplier firms 
have to find ways of managing their internal processes in order to convince buyers that they 
should have access to particular supply chains. These ways of managing must enable them to 
deal with the demands of the buying firm in terms of the sorts of products which it requires 
and what this means in terms of how the relationship between the two is to be governed. 
Finding these ways of managing requires shaping the work-effort bargain and resolving the 
labour mobility issue in the context of particular institutional settings. In a global 
environment that is volatile and changing due to economic, financial, political, social and 
demographic factors, navigating these waters is difficult. The development of management 
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control strategies thus constitutes a central process through which we understand the 
dynamics between the varied competitive environments and governance structures of the 
supply chain (e.g. as elaborated in Gereffi et al. 2005) on the one hand and social relations at 
in the workplace on the other.   
Methodology and Cases 
The article is based on case studies of two supplier firms operating in a service value chain. 
IT services were chosen because they are considered as highly internationalised functions in 
offshore outsourcing, but beyond the example of India tend to receive less attention than the 
manufacturing sector in research on  global supply chains (Flecker & Meil 2010).  The 
services supply chain between Japan and China constitutes an empirical setting which is 
largely unexplored. The suppliers are Chinese firms and the buyers are Japanese firms. Both 
Chinese supplier firms operate in IT outsourcing though one firm is primarily concerned with 
inputting information for clients, whilst the other also designs software for analysing data. 
Both firms have been closely involved for two decades in providing outsourced IT services to 
Japanese companies both offshore (in China) and onshore (in Japan).  
One of the firms, Data-Co (anonymised for reasons of confidentiality), is private, 
whilst the other, Software-Co (similarly anonymised), is established, funded and 
managerially controlled by a public university, thus constituting a particular kind of state-
owned enterprise (see Eun et al. (2006) for a discussion of Chinese university-run 
enterprises). Data-Co is based in Dalian City in North East China whilst Software-Co was 
established and remains based in Shanghai. The diversity of ownerships and locations allows 
us to take account of the internal diversity and variegated nature of Chinese capitalism (Peck 
& Zhang 2013).  
The empirical case study was developed from 2011 in four research sites in both 
China and Japan: the Chinese workplace of Data-Co in Shanghai, the Japanese workplace of 
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Data-Co in Tokyo, the Chinese workplace of Software in Dalian and the Japanese workplace 
of Software-Co in Tokyo. Researching workplaces in both countries allows us to capture the 
complexity of internationally-operating firms and to understand the interaction between 
workplaces in different countries.  
The focus of empirical study was on how supplier firms manage to meet their 
clients’ requirements whilst making profits, with specific reference to the firms’ 
management control strategies and practices. Multiple research collection methods were 
adopted including observation, interviews and archival materials. The observation involved 
the first author working as a HR consultant within Data-Co’s Chinese workplace for two 
months and then in both firms’ Japanese workplaces in Tokyo for another two months. 
The observation generated detailed insights into the general working environments and 
employees’ daily experience at work as well as outside work (the researcher stayed in 
the employees’ dormitory in Japan, so had opportunities to participate in their leisure 
activities and observed their lives outside work). It also allowed the researcher to draw 
from a well of ‘shared’ experiences in the construction of the analysis in the light of the 
researcher’s position as a HR consultant working with the management teams of the 
supplier firms. The nuance produced by the researcher’s fieldnotes was supplemented 
by 140 interviews conducted during the primary fieldwork in 2012 and the post-
fieldwork period in 2013 and 2014 (arranged as follow-up interviews). Table 1 breaks 
down the interviewees by research site. The entire interview dataset covered all positions 
in the organisational hierarchy in both firms. The length of the interviews varied from 60 to 
90 minutes each. Most interviews were undertaken in Chinese language except seven of them 
which were in Japanese with the help of an interpreter who spoke both Chinese and Japanese. 
All interviews were recorded and subsequently transcribed with the exception of seven 
individuals who preferred not to be recorded. Finally, analysis of archival materials 
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provided macro-level data on the historical and institutional context of service 
outsourcing industry and the two case firms since the 1990s.  
Table 1: Interviewees by research site 
Research sites Data-Co  
(Dalian, China) 
Data-Co  
(Tokyo, Japan) 
Software-Co 
(Shanghai, China) 
Software-Co 
(Tokyo, Japan) 
No. of interviews 43 15 38 44 
 
The analysis was undertaken in an iterative process, following the chronological 
collection of the data. We started the first-round data coding by picking out key events, 
issues and interactions from the interview transcriptions, fieldnotes and archival 
materials from Data-Co. This was followed by a second round of coding with a view to 
producing thematic categories, loosely informed by the literature on global supply chain 
and management control. We then analysed data from Software-Co on the basis of codes 
generated through the analysis of Data-Co’s data. We grouped the events, issues and 
interactions into the existing codes, and added to or amended these codes to 
incorporate these additional instances. We repeated this iterative and recurrent process 
of coding, as an emergent story of the field began to unfold. The analysis of the empirical 
data is presented in the following section. 
Data-Co and Its Japanese Clients 
While both Data-Co and Software-Co entered into supply chains by providing customised 
services to a small number of Japanese firms, they later on developed two contrasting supply 
chain relationships with their Japanese clients.  Relationships between Data-Co and its clients 
can be described as transactional and market-based as the service required was highly 
standardised whilst the relationships between Software-Co and its clients fit more Gereffi et 
al.’s view of a ‘captive’ governance structure. To illustrate this, we discuss each set of 
relationships in detail.  
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Data-Co initially entered into the BPO supply chain based on the founder’s personal 
networks with a small number of Japanese firms. It aimed to maintain long-term relations 
with these firms by offering customised services and hoped to further develop new clients 
through existing clients’ recommendations. However, in the early 2000s, Data-Co reviewed 
its strategies and decided to change its supply chain strategy from ‘building up long-term, 
personal-based relations with a limited number of clients’ (D-D2), to establishing contractual 
relations with as many clients as possible. In this market-based GVC, Data-Co offers 
standardised instead of customised services, emphasises the role of the marketing department 
in developing new clients, and ends up taking many one-off orders from different clients. In 
order to survive in this product market, it needs to be highly cost efficient, highly accurate, 
highly data security conscious, highly flexible (to changing client demands) and highly 
sensitive to the expectations of Japanese buyers.    
There were both ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors that had driven this change. On the one 
hand, the increasingly mature, transparent and standardised nature of the outsourcing market 
in Japan enabled Japanese firms to select suppliers through competitive bids in the open 
market, in which long-term relations and personal recommendations became less important. 
Such market development ‘pushed’ Data-Co to review and adjust its initial strategy towards a 
more market-based one.  
This market-based strategy was also reinforced by how the labour market in Dalian 
was evolving and the opportunities this provided for the company to become more flexible 
and cost-conscious. Dalian City is a port city in Liaoning province and is the major gateway 
to China’s northeast region. Being less than two hours away from Japan by airplane and a 
former colonial city of Japan, the Dalian local government has taken a distinct development 
path since the 1990s, largely relying on providing relatively low-skilled outsourcing services 
to Japanese organisations. This strategy has led to a booming business cluster of hundreds of 
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companies providing business process outsourcing (BPO) and information technology 
outsourcing (ITO) services. In Thomas Friedman's (2005) bestseller ‘The World is Flat’, 
Dalian City is described as the ‘Bangalore of China’.  
This regional strategy has been reinforced with the development of a large population 
of low-skilled migrant workers from the rural areas of Northern China. These migrants have 
been able to study in the local Dalian technical schools for one or two years and then seek job 
opportunities in the cluster.  According to the HR manager, there are more than 15 technical 
schools in and near Dalian City, which provides a large pool of job candidates every year. 
Given the availability of low-skilled labour and support from the government in 
developing low-skilled BPO services, Data-Co finds itself in an appropriate position to 
provide standardised services to Japanese clients in an arm’s length market, focusing on 
‘winning as many orders as possible’ rather than ‘making much effort to offer customised 
services to a few clients’. As the CEO emphasised in a managerial meeting, ‘what we provide 
is essentially quick services with small profit margins’ (D-D41). In the long run, Data-Co 
plans to continue to pursue its strategy in market-based supply chains. As one interviewee 
confirmed, ‘we have the resources as long as the cluster exists. We just need to continue 
bringing in new clients.’ (D-D38) 
Recruitment and managing labour mobility 
Business in Data-Co largely depends on the season. Every year, the period from August to 
the following February is considered to be the ‘busy season’ since the firm gets a large 
amount of business involving inputting annual reports for Japanese institutions and editing 
Christmas and New Year cards. March to July is seen as the ‘low season’, during which the 
firm and consequently the workers do not get as much work to do. In order to match the 
predictable peaks and troughs of their business, Data-Co wants its labour to be both available 
(in the busy seasons) and disposable (in the quiet seasons). In achieving this, three strategies 
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have been adopted to manage labour mobility. First, Data-Co has secured a stable labour 
source by recruiting senior graduating students from local technical schools, with which it 
has developed close collaborations. 75% of them are women. The recruitment (accompanied 
by the 3 month training period described below) takes place every year and it is strategically 
scheduled before the busy season every year, so that there is enough ‘hoarded’ labour for the 
coming business. New student recruits have to finish a one-year internship assignment before 
they can sign a standard three-year employment contract with the company. These interns are 
paid at a much lower wage rate (at 400-600RMB per month) than that of the established 
workers and the mid-career entrants (normally at 1,100–3,000RMB per month). The use of 
student interns reflects the move of the Chinese employment system from a state-centric to a 
more fragmented market-centric one, featuring a greater degree of informalisation and 
deregulation (Friedman & Lee 2010; see als Smith & Chan 2015 for a more detailed analysis 
of the use of interns in China).  
Second, Data-Co manages to achieve a certain level of labour flexibility and cost 
efficiency by ‘letting’ workers voluntarily leave for other companies during the low seasons, 
without making much effort to retain them. This is achieved by implementing a pay system 
which minimises the fixed basic pay whist emphasising variable piece-rate bonus. On the one 
hand, the fixed basic pay only accounted for 40% for the employee monthly income 
(corporate report, 2013). Informants noted that the fixed basic pay in Data-Co (avg. 
800RMB) was clearly inferior to the best rates in the cluster (avg.1000RMB). On the other 
hand, the amount of piece-rate bonus depends on the amount of orders the company can get. 
Workers got well paid during the busy seasons when they had lots of overtime opportunities. 
This, however, meant that during the quiet season when workers were not doing overtime, 
pay was particularly low, leading to people leaving the company at that time – which in turn 
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reduced costs to the firm. One informant reflected, ‘we stay during the busy seasons and we 
are free to job-hop during the low seasons to secure a higher basic pay’ (D-D12).  
Notably, even the so-called ‘fixed’ basic pay is not stable and guaranteed. This is 
because workers are required to take a skill exam every June, regardless of their length of 
service, and the exam results will decide their basic salaries for the upcoming year, in a 
distribution determined by management (Table 2). This uncertainty about future earnings also 
results in more employees ‘voluntarily’ leaving the firm both because they are dissatisfied 
with their upcoming basic salaries and with their inability to secure a particular grade (and 
associated wage) over longer than one year at a time.  
Table 2: Distribution of scores and basic salaries in Data-Co 
Score 0-50 51-70 71-90 91-100 above 100 
Grade grade 1 grade 2 grade 3 grade 4 grade 5 
Basic salary  
(in RMB) 
600-699 700-799 800-899 900-999 1000-1100 
% of employees* 5% 50% 25% 15% 5% 
Source: Interviews and corporate documents. 
  
* % of employees is based on estimation. The HR manager said that the markers are expected 
to maintain this distribution so that the wage bill for the company does not fluctuate too much 
resulting in individuals employees having to bear the risk and uncertainty that their basic 
wage may go down in any particular year. 
Workers in Data-Co are used to the idea of moving to jobs in other companies as the 
existence of the local cluster of BPO companies in the area provides ample job opportunities; 
as one interviewee stated, ‘I move around in the cluster depending on which company gets 
big orders and needs people’(D-D25). However, gender and age appear to underpin 
variations in turnover. HR statistics show that 70% of workers who have been serving for 
more than five years are married females. Many women explained that they prioritised 
employment stability over salary after marriage in order to focus on family and childcare. A 
small number of them attributed this to age, suggesting they had limited outside choice as 
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they got older and the physical demands of the inputting process became more difficult. One 
38-year old senior worker reflected that ‘experience does not count in BPO. The younger, the 
quicker, the more choices you have.’ (D-D28) 
Third, maintaining labour flexibility in this way was facilitated by a well-established 
and short-term training system, through which the inexperienced recruits are trained to be 
qualified semi-skilled workers within three months. Data-Co’s training programme 
exclusively focuses on the basic skills of typing Japanese characters, letters and numbers. 
Interns are taught to use an application, which enables them to type Japanese characters based 
on their structures (appearances), rather than on pronunciations or meanings. In this way 
managers demonstrate that ‘the company is able to train workers within three months to 
become semi-skilled workers, even if they know neither Japanese nor about computers before 
they join’ (D-D10). One worker recalled her experience: 
I knew little about Japanese... We were taught a few Japanese words in order to use 
the operating system in the Japanese language. Then we were trained to type Japanese 
without knowing its meaning and pronunciation. After we learnt to type Japanese 
correctly, the instructors gave us a large amount of practice in order to improve our 
input speeds and accuracy. We kept practising every day, until we met the standards 
of the final test. (D-D17) 
These three approaches to managing labour mobility have enabled Data-Co to focus on short-
term profit maximisation without engaging in large and long-term investments in recruitment, 
training and labour retention. This is considered to be crucial for the survival of private 
enterprises in China, which compared to state or quasi-state enterprises have little access to 
bank loans and thus have to operate under hard budget constraints, relying on self-
accumulated capital (Tsai 2002; Rothman 2005). As the CEO confirmed, ‘we need to secure 
a healthy inflow every month to pay for our employees.’ (D-D1) 
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Managing labour effort 
The use of semi-skilled employees with limited training in a context where the Japanese 
buyers of services expected high levels of efficiency and reliability, however, posed problems 
for the company as their clients expected them to achieve 100% delivery accuracy, i.e. after 
checks and corrections though as one manager explained this is measured loosely on the 
feedback from clients after delivery; ‘as long as the clients do not identify any mistake after 
delivery, we assume that the delivery accuracy for this project is 100%’ (D-T3). However, 
this is built on a much more stringent monitoring at the individual level where the degree of 
first-time accuracy of the input is recorded in each individual’s performance chart every day 
and used for internal evaluation, improvement and employee training. How can Data-Co 
achieve high levels of both delivery and first-time accuracy with semi-skilled workers 
inputting data in a language in which they have only had three months training? The answer 
is that they operate a very intensive form of direct control over the employees. 
Delivery accuracy is controlled through a work procedure, which is called the ‘double 
input and multiple checks’ system. Under this procedure, every piece of work needs to be 
input twice by two operators respectively, followed by a three-fold checking process 
including a comparison check between the two inputs (by team leaders), a sample check (also 
by team leaders) and a final check before delivery (by project managers). Mistakes identified 
during the comparison check and the sample check will be corrected immediately. Failure to 
be accurate will be logged on the individual’s performance chart. If there is any problem 
identified during the final check, workers are likely to be asked to re-do the whole work.  
Second, the performance of the individual employee is monitored through the 
collection of data on first-time accuracy. Every operator has an individual chart on which 
his/her daily performance, such as the quantity of work and the number of errors, is recorded 
by his/her team leaders every day. Since the team leaders are in charge of all comparison 
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checks, they are expected to observe the mismatch during their work and identify the 
individual responsible for each error. Once they have identified the operator who makes the 
error, they will record this on this member’s daily performance chart. According to company 
policy, operators are given penalties for every single error they have made. The amount of the 
penalties for each error is informed by the nature of the project, and it is usually set and 
announced by the project manager before the operators start working on this project. By the 
end of each month, the team leaders multiply the set penalties for each error by the total 
number of errors that have been recorded for each operator and work out the total amount of 
penalties for each operator. They then submit this result to the HR Department and the HR 
staff will subtract the penalties from each operator’s monthly pay.  
In the daily operation of the workplace, the direct control over employees is reflected 
also in the effort to tightly structure the working day which is arranged according to a bell-
controlled timetable. Throughout the day, the bell rings 10 times to notify workers of 
working, breaks and meetings, as shown in Table 3. Team leaders work in the same operating 
rooms as their members and monitor their behaviour closely. Operators are required to sit at 
desk during working time. They are not allowed to chat with each other and should ask for 
permission if they need to leave. Overtime is common especially during the busy seasons. 
Although overtime is voluntary in principle, workers who refuse to take overtime work 
without reasonable cause are seen as undisciplined and unmotivated, and they are likely to be 
low-rated for promotion.  
Table 3. The bell-controlled timetable in Data-Co 
Time 8:30 10:00 10:15 11:30 12:30 14:00 14:15 16:00 17:15 17:30 
Acti-
vity 
Work break work lunch 
break 
work break work break daily 
meet-
ing 
leave 
work  
Interestingly, these procedures were partly functional and partly ceremonial. Lower 
level supervisors had some discretion in terms of their punishments and control so long as 
output maintained 100% delivery accuracy which given the amount of double checking 
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which occurred was likely to happen anyway. However, as one informant made clear, it was 
important to show Japanese buyers that the company has set high standard for its services and 
employees. This interviewee stated, ‘what can be more convincing than showing our clients 
this work procedure and telling them mistakes could hardly be missed under this procedure?’ 
(D-D15). However, it is relevant to note that according to the interviews, Japanese clients 
concern themselves with whether the suppliers have covered all the details and rules existing 
in the paperwork but pay little attention on how these rules are carried out in practice. Our 
informant reflected: 
During the visits, they [Japanese clients] walk around the building and take a look at our 
operating rooms. They do not normally ask to enter into the operating rooms. They just 
have a look through the windows. Frankly, the observations through these visits are 
superficial. They do sometimes ask us how certain rules are carried out orally, but they 
don’t check in practice.  (D-T12) 
The main concern of the Japanese clients is delivery accuracy, i.e. output control, rather than 
procedural control. Nevertheless, their occasional presence in Data-Co.’s workplace is used 
to reinforce the system of direct control and surveillance which is established.  
In relation to our Data-Co case, we see that in order to win and sustain a profitable 
business, Data-Co management have to develop control strategies which meet the 
requirements of the product market and the supply chains in which they are located. In this 
case these requirements are for cost efficiencies, high levels of delivery accuracy, and the 
ability to deal with peaks and troughs of business. In order to meet these requirements, they 
have moulded a control system which combines a workplace regime based on high levels of 
direct control, highly segmented work with a labour mobility regime that provides the firm 
with the flexibility in terms of numbers of employees to meet peaks and troughs. All this is 
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managed also through a recruitment system and a wage payment system which keeps costs 
low in spite of high levels of labour turnover. 
Software-Co and Its Japanese Client 
Like Data-Co., Software-Co also started into the outsourcing business with a small number of 
Japanese clients. However, instead of developing high volumes of new clients as Data-Co 
does, Software-Co now devotes itself largely to one single client, from which it gets almost 
90% of its total business. Since 2001, Data-Co has gradually terminated contracts with other 
existing clients and stopped developing new clients. It has been concentrating on building a 
long-term, particularistic relationship with the Nomura Research Institute (NRI), a well-
known Japanese firm operating in the fields of consulting, financial IT solutions and IT 
platform services. In doing so, Software-Co restructured its work procedures and systems in 
order to better adapt to the complex and specialised products in NRI. Such idiosyncratic 
changes and investments helped Software-Co retain its orders from NRI, but confined the 
company virtually to working only for NRI, as one senior developer explained: 
NRI has its own specifications for products in terms of the programming language, 
platforms, procedures and systems. For instance, we were required to use ‘Cobol’ 
programming. It is an outdated programming approach which most people do not 
know. Therefore, we have to train our programmers to use this particular approach, 
but it is unlikely to be used for any other clients. (S-S23) 
In contrast to the market-based supply chain relationship which featured with Data-Co, the 
relationship between Software-Co and NRI can be characterised as a captive supply chain 
relationship (Gereffi et al. 2005). That is, Software-Co is highly dependent on the client and 
faces big losses if it fails to keep receiving business from the client. This was particularly 
evident when the 2008 global crisis caused tremendous cutbacks in demand for outsourcing 
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from NRI to China and consequently led to a severe stagnation of business in Software-Co 
and a massive reduction of in some areas of staffing, by almost 50%. 
Software-Co’s choice to develop a relationship with one single client, rather than 
market-based relationships with many clients, is closely related to the company’s origins. 
Although Software-Co was established in 1991, it only started receiving business orders (and 
generating revenues) from Japanese firms in 1996 and did not fully engage in outsourcing 
business until 2001. Between 1991 and 2001, Software-Co primarily focused on running a 
training programme in collaboration with the Japan International Development Organisation 
(JAIDO). In this programme, selected Chinese university graduates were sent to Japanese 
firms for a minimum of three years and received on-the-job training (OJT) in the fields of 
software design, development and programming. The initiative of this training programme 
was seen by the University as ‘a response to the Chinese State’s call for developing high-tech 
industry and high-skilled talents’ (S-T1). The training program was partly funded by the state 
through the university and partly funded by JAIDO. 
Through running this training programme, Software-Co accumulated a good number 
of well-trained software developers, who spoke both Japanese and Chinese and had 
experience in working in Japanese firms. By the end of 2000, Software-Co had had about 120 
well-trained and highly skilled software developers in its Chinese workplace. In 2001, 
JAIDO exited from the collaboration, which announced the end of the training programme 
and Software-Co became a full contractor of software services for Japanese companies. 
Given its distinctive advantage in human resources with high levels of competence in 
Japanese language etc., Software-Co developed a strategy to enter global supply chains that 
required relatively higher value-added and customised software services focused on Japanese 
clients, starting with a small number of big clients and eventually concentrating just on its 
NRI business. Software-Co stressed the importance of getting deeply involved with NRI to 
 20 
better understand its working procedures and management systems and develop solutions that 
can best fit with it. Many interviewees highlighted that developing particularistic 
relationships with clients could make use of the firm’s competitive advantage in skilled 
employees: 
We considered two alternative strategies. The first was to downgrade and to focus on 
pure coding and programming. This would bring us more clients but it’s low-skilled. 
The second was to upgrade, in which case we would develop expertise in software 
design and enhance our capacity to make ourselves important and necessary to 
NRI…We decided to choose the latter in the end because we had these well trained 
developers and it is a waste of human resource if we make them do all the 
standardised coding and programming work. (S-S3) 
In 2010, senior managers in Software-Co re-assessed its strategy and set a long-term vision, 
which focused on providing higher value-added and more customised system solutions. The 
aim was to improve the firm’s capability and increase the mutual interdependence between 
the clients and itself. As the manager explained, ‘we want to be also to provide distinctive 
solutions to our clients so that our clients rely on us as much as we rely on them’ (S-T-2).    
Product wise, Software-Co provides a ‘package’ of services including both software 
design, which requires close liaison with clients, and software programming, which involves 
monotonous coding and testing. As we will discuss below, such services have led to two 
different employee groups within Software-Co: software design is conducted by software 
developers while programming is carried out by software programmers. Software developers 
and software programmers work together in task-based teams. The work procedure is 
described as a ‘water flow’ which starts from software design and can only move to the phase 
of programming after the design stage has been completed. The team leaders are all 
developers and they have the greatest responsibility for the team operation. The span of 
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control is always between twenty to thirty junior software developers and programmers under 
a team leader.  
Recruitment and managing labour mobility 
Despite the end of the international collaboration, the recruitment and training programme of 
the software developers has continued in the same manner. Specifically, software developers 
are selected from the top four universities in Shanghai (the company’s home base). Being 
owned by the university has given Software-Co easy access to the best graduates. Once hired, 
developers are provided with a systematic training for a minimum of five years. This includes 
one year of off-the-job language training at university, one year of OJT at the Shanghai 
headquarters, and three years of OJT in Japan at their clients’ workplaces. During the first 
year, trainees learn nothing technical, but only the Japanese language. The Japanese lessons 
are held at the university and are given by university lecturers. At the end of this period of 
study, those who are certificated at the highest level (N1) of the Japanese Language 
Proficiency Test are able to start the second phase of training in the Chinese workplace. At 
this stage, trainees are assigned to different teams and told to observe and learn the basic 
procedures and techniques involving in software programming and design.  
After preparation relating to both language and basic skills, trainees are then 
expatriated to Japan and given three years of OJT in Japanese clients’ companies. It is worth 
noting that before trainees leave for Japan, economic control is exerted in order to guarantee 
a trainee’s return. Trainees have to sign a legal agreement with the company before they 
leave for Japan, agreeing to serve the company for at least five years after they complete their 
training in Japan. Those who fail to fulfil this commitment have to pay the company 
liquidated damages of 100,000RMB. The lengthy training and the financial constraints after 
the training mean that once hired, these developers are locked into 10-year contracts (5 years 
training and 5 year post-training with major financial penalties binding software developers 
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to the firm). Thus the company seeks to ensure that it does not lose the major investment it 
has made in training the software developers. After the training, developers can choose to 
either continue to work in Japan with clients or return to Software’s Chinese workplaces, 
normally leading a group of programmers. In either case, the developers continue to focus on 
software design work.   
Besides the training programme and the legal agreement, the nature of work and 
employment in Data-Co has also contributed to the immobility of software developers. First, 
the systematic training programme develops a homogeneous and isolated group of employees 
who not only accepted but indeed very much appreciated the existing corporate culture and 
work environment. This is most evident during the developers’ expatriations in Japan. The 
collective accommodation in Japan, the stressful long working hours at the same Japanese 
workplaces, the homesickness and anxiety about working and living in a foreign country 
push these employees to rely on each other in both work and life. They see each other as the 
best of colleagues, friends and even as family. They spend most of their time within their 
‘comfort zone’ with each other, to the extent that they lose opportunities and motivation to 
socialise with other people. Second, salaries of software developers are at the top of the 
market. There also exists a structured internal career path through which developers pursue 
career progression. Combined, these features constitute a working situation which is seen by 
many developers in Software-Co as being too comfortable to leave. Third, the skills they 
learnt in Software-Co are highly firm-specific and therefore unlikely to be very helpful in 
their job hunting. These restraints limit developers’ outside choices. Indeed, company 
statistics show that between 2005 and 2010, no single developer quit after completing 
training.  
The privileged treatment of developers creates a strong sense of elitism, in sharp 
contrast with the other group of lesser skilled employees within the companies (known as 
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‘software programmers’). The recruitment of programmers did not start until 2001 when they 
were hired to carry out routinised programming and coding tasks to allow developers to 
concentrate on the higher value-added work of software design. In contrast with developers, 
programmers are sourced from various channels including universities, local job centres, job 
agencies and personal recommendation. They are selected based on specific skills, 
experiences and qualifications in computer-related areas. No training is provided to them and 
they only work in the Chinese workplace. While the developers are considered 
metaphorically as computers in which the company is willing to invest good software (by its 
long-term training), programmers are expected to be ‘plug-and-play devices’ which can be 
used immediately after recruitment. The absence of training poses challenges to the 
programmers, especially the newly-hired ones. One new programmer said that she had to 
learn the Japanese language in her spare time in order to use the operating system which is 
displayed completely in Japanese. Yet, she received no support from the company.    
Programmers are paid a monthly salary which is also determined by their length of 
service. In contrast to the top level salary of developers, the salary rates for programmers are 
below the industrial average and many programmers are not satisfied with their earnings. 
Whilst developers have a clear career path based on internal promotion, programmers have 
little career prospect within the company since all managerial positions are taken by 
developers. Given this, many young programmers use Software-Co as a springboard for their 
careers, and expect to leave for another company as soon as they accumulate some 
experience. In effect they are disposable labour, paid at a low rate to do standardised tasks 
and easily replaceable. Not surprisingly, then, average turnover rates among programmers 
were above 50% every year with the rate among male programmers about 60% per year 
compared to 15% amongst women. Again, the female programmers thought that although the 
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career development was limited in Software-Co, they were compensated by the stable work 
and incremental salary increases, which enabled them to care for family and children. 
Managing labour efforts 
As in Data-Co, the management of labour effort in Software-Co has focused on delivering 
high quality services to Japanese clients. Specifically, this involves a series of management 
control approaches that differ significantly between developers and programmers.  
Systematic OJT at the sites of the Japanese clients is considered the best way to equip 
developers with the knowledge and capabilities to deliver high-quality work that best meets 
clients’ requirements. During the OJT, developers are trained and supervised by both 
Japanese clients and Software-Co’s Japanese office. They are assigned to a team in the 
Japanese clients’ firm. They are given tasks and allowed access to all information. Each 
developer is allocated to an experienced member of staff in the Japanese client who works as 
a coach and provides instructions to help them learn skills and processes. Under such 
arrangements, developers are considered as the learners and eventually carriers of ‘Japanese’ 
knowledge and practices. They are provided sufficient time and opportunities to acquire and 
accumulate knowledge of Japanese management, to adopt Japanese practices in their daily 
work, and to update their experience and perceptions about Japanese management during 
their socialisation with Japanese colleagues and clients. This first-hand knowledge and 
experience of Japanese management builds a strong relationship between the Chinese 
supplier and the Japanese client in terms of confidence in the ability of Software-Co to 
deliver to the level expected by the Japanese firm. 
This confidence is reinforced by an acknowledgement on both sides that part of the 
role of training in Japan is to ensure that Japanese procedures and standards are brought back 
to China and are implemented there as quality control measures. Such procedures and 
standards included a suggestion system, which encourages developers to give constructive 
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suggestions to improve the existing systems; a knowledge sharing program aimed to 
accumulate knowledge through developers’ sharing and improving the capabilities of the firm 
in dealing with complex systems; and a Hansei system which requires individuals to be open 
to the negative feedback from colleagues, reflect on and learn from their own mistakes. All 
these practices resonate with the philosophy of Kaizen (continuous improvement) in Japanese 
companies, and emphasise employees’ active participation in improvement and problem 
solving. 
In fact, given the extensive training offered to the developers and their deep 
involvement in Japanese companies, high-quality and customised design has always been the 
competitive advantage of Software-Co. Developers are often considered as a group of people 
who are experienced, hard-working, reliable, highly committed and capable of accomplishing 
predictable results. In the day-to-day operation, developers are given plenty of discretion to 
exercise their judgement in actual implementation and they are responsible for the quality of 
their own designs. This is partly because of the intangible and interactive nature of their 
tasks, and partly due to the trust that has been built up through the training. The project 
managers work as facilitators rather than monitors, encouraging participation and the 
delegation of responsibility and accountability. As a consequence, the work discipline among 
developers is generally experienced as loose and flexible, representing a case of ‘responsible 
autonomy’. 
Once the software design is settled, however, programmers start converting the design 
into lines of code and conducting tests. For programmers, high-quality work means that the 
codes are in complete accordance with the design and are accurate. Unlike the developers 
who enjoy considerable autonomy during work, programmer’s work is tightly specified and 
monitored, particularly through the requirement to follow the manual strictly. The manual is a 
minutely prescribed guide book on how to test each code. It includes long lists of items which 
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need to be tested as well as a detailed instruction on how to test each item. In practice, 
programmers need to submit a testing sheet after each test which is designed completely 
according to the manuals. For each item, they need to tick the box to confirm that it has been 
tested and also fill in the expected and actual results. The quality of testing report is evaluated 
by the team leaders (who are developers) and it forms an important aspect in programmer’s 
performance assessment. In contrast with the developers’ work which requires high levels of 
technical and interpersonal skills, programmers’ work is usually experienced to be repetitive, 
monotonous and formalised. In this sense, many programmers described themselves as ‘IT 
coolies’ who are dealing with low-skill work in IT industry and lack core competencies in the 
labour market.  
In sum, Software-Co has developed a management control system that is bifurcated 
between developers and programmers. Management of developers is mainly achieved 
through ‘soft’ approaches and responsible autonomy through for example, employee training 
and high levels of employee discretion. These employees are key to maintaining the 
relationship with the client. They are highly knowledgeable about how the client works and 
what the client’s expectations are. These developers are a highly valuable resource in keeping 
the business in the supply chain and they are held tight by the company through its seniority 
rewards system and its penalties for early departure. The elite status of the group also 
reinforces these rewards and makes them dominant within the company. However this is a 
highly costly strategy and only works because it is combined with the employment of 
relatively low skilled programmers managed under conditions of direct control and paid 
relatively low wages. Once again it is the ability to manage these internal dynamics and 
labour market aspects that enables the supplying firm to meet the product market demands of 
its client.  
Discussion and Conclusions 
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In this section, we compare our cases in order to clarify the theoretical contribution which we 
wish to make. We follow this through with a summary of the key additions we wish to place 
into the debate on GVCs/GPNs. 
In relation to our cases, we deal firstly with the similarities. In this respect the most 
important to our argument is that in order to participate in global supply chains in a way 
which both meets the requirements of clients and enables the firm to make a profit, the 
supplier firm has to develop a distinctive managerial control strategy. This reflects the 
growing emphasis within the literature (e.g. Coe & Yeung 2015) on the strategic choice 
involved in developing supply chains. We find that in both cases, managers combine 
strategies in the workplace to control different groups of employees with a strategy towards 
the issue of labour mobility (as discussed in Smith 2006). Within the workplace itself, we 
find that direct control is a significant feature of both contexts though in Software-Co, this is 
combined with a strategy of responsible autonomy aimed at the software developers. In both 
cases, managers of the supply firms are aiming at controlling the workplace not just for 
functional reasons but also as part of their strategy for maintaining their relationship with 
Japanese clients. Thus both firms studied were keen to impress their clients when they are on 
site with them in Japan or when clients visit the Chinese locations that they are aware of the 
high standards required of them. In Data-Co, there is an element of ‘performance’ in this as 
they know that their clients are more concerned with checking paperwork and procedures 
than actually observing in detail workplace practices. In contrast, in Software-Co, the elite 
group of software developers are thoroughly socialised into the Japanese way of working by 
their three years training on site in Japan. Therefore, the overall ethos of the company is to 
draw on Japanese work practices and procedures, though in the case of the less skilled 
programmers, conformity is more likely to be secured by direct control techniques. 
Nevertheless, there is a common ‘dominance’ effect (Smith & Meiksins 1995) at work in 
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both cases in that the Chinese suppliers see Japan as the more advanced country in terms of 
management techniques such as quality improvement, reliability etc., and therefore do not 
resist the imposition of Japanese standards, even if, in the case of Data-Co, there is some 
‘ceremonial’ conformity. Rather they are happy to learn about these practices and discourses, 
in the case of Data-Co as it improves their business position vis-à-vis other potential Japanese 
business and in the case of Software-Co because it reinforces their elite status and 
distinctiveness from other Chinese competitors. 
Although there are some significant regional differences between Dalian and 
Shanghai (see, for example, the discussions on regions in Breznitz & Murphree 2014 and on 
China as a form of ‘variegated capitalism’ in Peck and Zhang 2013), both regions continue to 
produce large numbers of semi-skilled graduates of technical schools and colleges. This 
enables both companies to manage their semi-skilled data inputters and programmers with a 
high degree of flexibility, such that they can respond to peaks and troughs in business by 
losing or gaining employees relatively easily without having to pay premium rates. By 
contrast, Software-Co’s software developers coming from the top Shanghai universities are in 
very tight labour markets, yet the company succeeds in locking them in by a combination of 
providing elite status and high levels of training plus a good payment package together with 
restrictive labour contracts. It therefore has very low turnover amongst a group that 
potentially has many opportunities open for it in Shanghai’s dynamic technology sector. Thus 
both companies operate in similar labour market conditions characterised by the shift in 
China from state control to labour contracts that are relatively deregulated and increasingly 
shaped by market conditions. 
The main difference between the companies is the product market in which they are 
located. Data-Co offers simple data input services, whilst Software Co is primarily a software 
development service which offers a programming service as well. This difference is informed 
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by the historical and institutional contexts in which the supplier firms are located. Data-Co 
competes on price as well as quality and reliability and is therefore in a highly competitive 
marketplace looking for a range of clients. In Gereffi et al’s terms its position in the supply 
chain is governed by the market, though as this paper describes this is only a partial view 
because it conceals the degree of managerial effort that has to go on within the company to 
satisfy the demands of the client. Software-Co has decided to predominantly become the 
supplier for one firm, NRI. It has invested a huge amount in this relationship, not least 
through the amount of time and effort which its trainee software developers undergo inside 
the Japanese sites of NRI. In this sense, it is what Gereffi et al describe as a ‘captive’ 
governance structure, though Software-Co is trying to strengthen its position in the chain by 
increasing the degree of interdependence between NRI and itself.  
 These differences feed into the different management control strategies that the two 
Chinese companies have developed. The importance of managing the relationship and the 
expectations of the client in the case of Software-Co has been resolved by the creation of the 
group of software developers who learn in a deep way what it means to be Japanese in terms 
of expectations, procedures and practices. This helps them continue to meet the complex and 
often tacit or implicit requirements for the software which their clients wish them to develop. 
Continuously managing these expectations requires that the software developers exercise 
‘responsible autonomy’ using their own discretion and skills to resolve problems as and when 
they arise. Data-Co on the other hand provides some minimal training in Japanese language 
and mimics some Japanese techniques but the key to meeting the client’s expectation is the 
use of direct control and highly labour intensive double and sometimes triple checking of 
data input to reach a 100% reliability criterion. In a Japanese context, the individual worker 
would be expected to reach this standard but in China it is recognised that this will not 
 30 
happen. Fortunately, from the point of view of management, labour is cheap and flexible to 
allow this ‘overstaffing’.  
The ownership-types have implications for the strategic choices in supplier firms. 
Since the official sources of credit of China are dominated by the state and adopt a lending 
policy which is biased in favour of SOEs, private companies such as Data-Co are pushed to 
focus on cost-reduction and short-term profit maximisation, rather than long-term value 
creation. This consequently reinforces control strategies highlighting labour flexibility and 
intense surveillance. By contrast, Software-Co, as a university-owned company connected to 
the state, has easier access to bank loans and that supports its long-term strategy and helps the 
company to continue to offer lengthy and expensive training programmes for developers, 
even after the company’s transformation from a training agency into an outsourcing company 
in 2001. The ready resources available in the university also give Software-Co access to the 
graduates and enable it to provide developers with one-year systematic Japanese language 
training at the university.  
Employee gender plays a role in the management of labour mobility. In both 
companies, many female employees, especially those who are married, tend to prioritise job 
stability over salary and career development. Therefore, they appear to be more tolerant of 
the unsatisfactory wages and slow promotion opportunities, and are less likely to use their 
‘labour mobility’ power. This is in line with the overall ‘male-breadwinner’ model which 
remains dominant in China in spite of high levels of female participation in the economy: 
women are expected to take on more responsibilities in family care, and men to earn more 
money (Cooke 2005; Gottfried & O’Reilly 2002). These female employees are normally in 
low-level positions such as shop-floor workers in Data-Co and programmers in Software-Co. 
Female employees in the middle- and top-level positions do not show such tolerance.  
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In conclusion, our paper began from the relative neglect in GVC/GPN studies of the 
question of management control strategies. GVC/GPN has generally been satisfied with 
identifying the nature of the linkage between the supplier and the buyer. What it has not 
sufficiently considered is how the capabilities of the supplier and the demands of the buyer 
are translated into management control strategies within the firm, especially the supplier 
firms. Such neglect is problematic because the continuity of supply chains relies on whether 
supplier firms and their employees can keep meeting the dual imperatives of client 
satisfaction and profit-making. Failure to achieve this will result in the ‘disarticulation’ of 
supply chains in which firms and their employees may find themselves ejected entirely from 
the chain as comparative advantages are lost to other places (Bair & Werner 2011). Here our 
paper revealed that to make these linkages work, firms have to exercise strategic choice in 
how they manage labour. We have emphasised that the supplier firms have to resolve both 
the effort bargain and the issue of retaining (or flexing) the required form of labour. On the 
effort bargain, we have suggested it may be useful to return to some basic concepts of 
management control such as ‘direct control’ and ‘responsible autonomy’, both of which we 
saw operating in our cases. On the labour mobility issue, we revealed that the companies 
were in an institutional and labour market context where it was relatively easy to maintain 
flexible control over numbers of semi-skilled employees but strategies for developing and 
keeping highly skilled employees (the software developers in Software-Co) required more 
complex arrangements because these employees were so central to ensuring that the ‘captive’ 
governance structure did not just lead to the exploitation of Software-Co but to a form of 
interdependency. Our cases show the importance of moving beyond simple typologies of 
governance with a deterministic emphasis and instead recognising the importance of 
management and employee agency in making supply chains work. Linking GVC/GPN 
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analysis to a better understanding of management control strategies inside the firms will add 
a new dimension to this research agenda. 
Notes 
1  We recognise the debate on the differences between various analytical frameworks 
including global commodity chains (GCCs), global value chains (GVCs) and global 
production networks (GPNs) (see Bair 2008). For the clarity and coherence of constructs, we 
adopt the generic ‘supply chain’ terminology in this paper. 
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